FEDERALIST No. 3
The Same Subject Continued (Concerning Dangers From Foreign
Force and Influence)
For the Independent Journal.
JAY
To the People of the State of
New York:
IT IS not a new observation that the people of any country
(if, like the Americans, intelligent and wellinformed) seldom adopt and steadily
persevere for many years in an erroneous opinion respecting their interests.
That consideration naturally tends to create great respect for the high opinion
which the people of America have so long and uniformly entertained of the
importance of their continuing firmly united under one federal government,
vested with sufficient powers for all general and national purposes. The more
attentively I consider and investigate the reasons which appear to have given
birth to this opinion, the more I become convinced that they are cogent and
conclusive. Among the many objects to which a wise and free people find it
necessary to direct their attention, that of providing for their SAFETY seems to
be the first. The SAFETY of the people doubtless has relation to a great variety
of circumstances and considerations, and consequently affords great latitude to
those who wish to define it precisely and comprehensively. At present I mean
only to consider it as it respects security for the preservation of peace and
tranquillity, as well as against dangers from FOREIGN ARMS AND INFLUENCE, as
from dangers of the LIKE KIND arising from domestic causes. As the former of
these comes first in order, it is proper it should be the first discussed. Let
us therefore proceed to examine whether the people are not right in their
opinion that a cordial Union, under an efficient national government, affords
them the best security that can be devised against HOSTILITIES from abroad. The
number of wars which have happened or will happen in the world will always be
found to be in proportion to the number and weight of the causes, whether REAL
or PRETENDED, which PROVOKE or INVITE them. If this remark be just, it becomes
useful to inquire whether so many JUST causes of war are likely to be given by
UNITED AMERICA as by DISUNITED America; for if it should turn out that United
America will probably give the fewest, then it will follow that in this respect
the Union tends most to preserve the people in a state of peace with other
nations. The JUST causes of war, for the most part, arise either from violation
of treaties or from direct violence. America has already formed treaties with no
less than six foreign nations, and all of them, except Prussia, are maritime,
and therefore able to annoy and injure us. She has also extensive commerce with
Portugal, Spain, and Britain, and, with respect to the two latter, has, in
addition, the circumstance of neighborhood to attend to. It is of high
importance to the peace of America that she observe the laws of nations towards
all these powers, and to me it appears evident that this will be more perfectly
and punctually done by one national government than it could be either by
thirteen separate States or by three or four distinct confederacies. Because
when once an efficient national government is established, the best men in the
country will not only consent to serve, but also will generally be appointed to
manage it; for, although town or country, or other contracted influence, may
place men in State assemblies, or senates, or courts of justice, or executive
departments, yet more general and extensive reputation for talents and other
qualifications will be necessary to recommend men to offices under the national
government,--especially as it will have the widest field for choice, and never
experience that want of proper persons which is not uncommon in some of the
States. Hence, it will result that the administration, the political counsels,
and the judicial decisions of the national government will be more wise,
systematical, and judicious than those of individual States, and consequently
more satisfactory with respect to other nations, as well as more SAFE with
respect to us. Because, under the national government, treaties and articles of
treaties, as well as the laws of nations, will always be expounded in one sense
and executed in the same manner,--whereas, adjudications on the same points and
questions, in thirteen States, or in three or four confederacies, will not
always accord or be consistent; and that, as well from the variety of
independent courts and judges appointed by different and independent
governments, as from the different local laws and interests which may affect and
influence them. The wisdom of the convention, in committing such questions to
the jurisdiction and judgment of courts appointed by and responsible only to one
national government, cannot be too much commended. Because the prospect of
present loss or advantage may often tempt the governing party in one or two
States to swerve from good faith and justice; but those temptations, not
reaching the other States, and consequently having little or no influence on the
national government, the temptation will be fruitless, and good faith and
justice be preserved. The case of the treaty of peace with Britain adds great
weight to this reasoning. Because, even if the governing party in a State should
be disposed to resist such temptations, yet as such temptations may, and
commonly do, result from circumstances peculiar to the State, and may affect a
great number of the inhabitants, the governing party may not always be able, if
willing, to prevent the injustice meditated, or to punish the aggressors. But
the national government, not being affected by those local circumstances, will
neither be induced to commit the wrong themselves, nor want power or inclination
to prevent or punish its commission by others. So far, therefore, as either
designed or accidental violations of treaties and the laws of nations afford
JUST causes of war, they are less to be apprehended under one general government
than under several lesser ones, and in that respect the former most favors the
SAFETY of the people. As to those just causes of war which proceed from direct
and unlawful violence, it appears equally clear to me that one good national
government affords vastly more security against dangers of that sort than can be
derived from any other quarter. Because such violences are more frequently
caused by the passions and interests of a part than of the whole; of one or two
States than of the Union. Not a single Indian war has yet been occasioned by
aggressions of the present federal government, feeble as it is; but there are
several instances of Indian hostilities having been provoked by the improper
conduct of individual States, who, either unable or unwilling to restrain or
punish offenses, have given occasion to the slaughter of many innocent
inhabitants. The neighborhood of Spanish and British territories, bordering on
some States and not on others, naturally confines the causes of quarrel more
immediately to the borderers. The bordering States, if any, will be those who,
under the impulse of sudden irritation, and a quick sense of apparent interest
or injury, will be most likely, by direct violence, to excite war with these
nations; and nothing can so effectually obviate that danger as a national
government, whose wisdom and prudence will not be diminished by the passions
which actuate the parties immediately interested. But not only fewer just causes
of war will be given by the national government, but it will also be more in
their power to accommodate and settle them amicably. They will be more temperate
and cool, and in that respect, as well as in others, will be more in capacity to
act advisedly than the offending State. The pride of states, as well as of men,
naturally disposes them to justify all their actions, and opposes their
acknowledging, correcting, or repairing their errors and offenses. The national
government, in such cases, will not be affected by this pride, but will proceed
with moderation and candor to consider and decide on the means most proper to
extricate them from the difficulties which threaten them. Besides, it is well
known that acknowledgments, explanations, and compensations are often accepted
as satisfactory from a strong united nation, which would be rejected as
unsatisfactory if offered by a State or confederacy of little consideration or
power. In the year 1685, the state of Genoa having offended Louis XIV.,
endeavored to appease him. He demanded that they should send their Doge, or
chief magistrate, accompanied by four of their senators, to FRANCE, to ask his
pardon and receive his terms. They were obliged to submit to it for the sake of
peace. Would he on any occasion either have demanded or have received the like
humiliation from Spain, or Britain, or any other POWERFUL nation? PUBLIUS.
FEDERALIST No. 4
The Same Subject Continued
(Concerning Dangers From Foreign Force and Influence)
For the Independent Journal.
JAY
To the People of the State of New York:
MY LAST paper assigned several
reasons why the safety of the people would be best secured by union against the
danger it may be exposed to by JUST causes of war given to other nations; and
those reasons show that such causes would not only be more rarely given, but
would also be more easily accommodated, by a national government than either by
the State governments or the proposed little confederacies. But the safety of
the people of America against dangers from FOREIGN force depends not only on
their forbearing to give JUST causes of war to other nations, but also on their
placing and continuing themselves in such a situation as not to INVITE hostility
or insult; for it need not be observed that there are PRETENDED as well as just
causes of war. It is too true, however disgraceful it may be to human nature,
that nations in general will make war whenever they have a prospect of getting
anything by it; nay, absolute monarchs will often make war when their nations
are to get nothing by it, but for the purposes and objects merely personal, such
as thirst for military glory, revenge for personal affronts, ambition, or
private compacts to aggrandize or support their particular families or
partisans. These and a variety of other motives, which affect only the mind of
the sovereign, often lead him to engage in wars not sanctified by justice or the
voice and interests of his people. But, independent of these inducements to war,
which are more prevalent in absolute monarchies, but which well deserve our
attention, there are others which affect nations as often as kings; and some of
them will on examination be found to grow out of our relative situation and
circumstances. With France and with Britain we are rivals in the fisheries, and
can supply their markets cheaper than they can themselves, notwithstanding any
efforts to prevent it by bounties on their own or duties on foreign fish. With
them and with most other European nations we are rivals in navigation and the
carrying trade; and we shall deceive ourselves if we suppose that any of them
will rejoice to see it flourish; for, as our carrying trade cannot increase
without in some degree diminishing theirs, it is more their interest, and will
be more their policy, to restrain than to promote it. In the trade to China and
India, we interfere with more than one nation, inasmuch as it enables us to
partake in advantages which they had in a manner monopolized, and as we thereby
supply ourselves with commodities which we used to purchase from them. The
extension of our own commerce in our own vessels cannot give pleasure to any
nations who possess territories on or near this continent, because the cheapness
and excellence of our productions, added to the circumstance of vicinity, and
the enterprise and address of our merchants and navigators, will give us a
greater share in the advantages which those territories afford, than consists
with the wishes or policy of their respective sovereigns. Spain thinks it
convenient to shut the Mississippi against us on the one side, and Britain
excludes us from the Saint Lawrence on the other; nor will either of them permit
the other waters which are between them and us to become the means of mutual
intercourse and traffic. From these and such like considerations, which might,
if consistent with prudence, be more amplified and detailed, it is easy to see
that jealousies and uneasinesses may gradually slide into the minds and cabinets
of other nations, and that we are not to expect that they should regard our
advancement in union, in power and consequence by land and by sea, with an eye
of indifference and composure. The people of America are aware that inducements
to war may arise out of these circumstances, as well as from others not so
obvious at present, and that whenever such inducements may find fit time and
opportunity for operation, pretenses to color and justify them will not be
wanting. Wisely, therefore, do they consider union and a good national
government as necessary to put and keep them in SUCH A SITUATION as, instead of
INVITING war, will tend to repress and discourage it. That situation consists in
the best possible state of defense, and necessarily depends on the government,
the arms, and the resources of the country. As the safety of the whole is the
interest of the whole, and cannot be provided for without government, either one
or more or many, let us inquire whether one good government is not, relative to
the object in question, more competent than any other given number whatever. One
government can collect and avail itself of the talents and experience of the
ablest men, in whatever part of the Union they may be found. It can move on
uniform principles of policy. It can harmonize, assimilate, and protect the
several parts and members, and extend the benefit of its foresight and
precautions to each. In the formation of treaties, it will regard the interest
of the whole, and the particular interests of the parts as connected with that
of the whole. It can apply the resources and power of the whole to the defense
of any particular part, and that more easily and expeditiously than State
governments or separate confederacies can possibly do, for want of concert and
unity of system. It can place the militia under one plan of discipline, and, by
putting their officers in a proper line of subordination to the Chief
Magistrate, will, as it were, consolidate them into one corps, and thereby
render them more efficient than if divided into thirteen or into three or four
distinct independent companies. What would the militia of Britain be if the
English militia obeyed the government of England, if the Scotch militia obeyed
the government of Scotland, and if the Welsh militia obeyed the government of
Wales? Suppose an invasion; would those three governments (if they agreed at
all) be able, with all their respective forces, to operate against the enemy so
effectually as the single government of Great Britain would? We have heard much
of the fleets of Britain, and the time may come, if we are wise, when the fleets
of America may engage attention. But if one national government, had not so
regulated the navigation of Britain as to make it a nursery for seamen--if one
national government had not called forth all the national means and materials
for forming fleets, their prowess and their thunder would never have been
celebrated. Let England have its navigation and fleet--let Scotland have its
navigation and fleet--let Wales have its navigation and fleet--let Ireland have
its navigation and fleet--let those four of the constituent parts of the British
empire be be under four independent governments, and it is easy to perceive how
soon they would each dwindle into comparative insignificance. Apply these facts
to our own case. Leave America divided into thirteen or, if you please, into
three or four independent governments--what armies could they raise and
pay--what fleets could they ever hope to have? If one was attacked, would the
others fly to its succor, and spend their blood and money in its defense? Would
there be no danger of their being flattered into neutrality by its specious
promises, or seduced by a too great fondness for peace to decline hazarding
their tranquillity and present safety for the sake of neighbors, of whom perhaps
they have been jealous, and whose importance they are content to see diminished?
Although such conduct would not be wise, it would, nevertheless, be natural. The
history of the states of Greece, and of other countries, abounds with such
instances, and it is not improbable that what has so often happened would, under
similar circumstances, happen again. But admit that they might be willing to
help the invaded State or confederacy. How, and when, and in what proportion
shall aids of men and money be afforded? Who shall command the allied armies,
and from which of them shall he receive his orders? Who shall settle the terms
of peace, and in case of disputes what umpire shall decide between them and
compel acquiescence? Various difficulties and inconveniences would be
inseparable from such a situation; whereas one government, watching over the
general and common interests, and combining and directing the powers and
resources of the whole, would be free from all these embarrassments, and conduce
far more to the safety of the people. But whatever may be our situation, whether
firmly united under one national government, or split into a number of
confederacies, certain it is, that foreign nations will know and view it exactly
as it is; and they will act toward us accordingly. If they see that our national
government is efficient and well administered, our trade prudently regulated,
our militia properly organized and disciplined, our resources and finances
discreetly managed, our credit re-established, our people free, contented, and
united, they will be much more disposed to cultivate our friendship than provoke
our resentment. If, on the other hand, they find us either destitute of an
effectual government (each State doing right or wrong, as to its rulers may seem
convenient), or split into three or four independent and probably discordant
republics or confederacies, one inclining to Britain, another to France, and a
third to Spain, and perhaps played off against each other by the three, what a
poor, pitiful figure will America make in their eyes! How liable would she
become not only to their contempt but to their outrage, and how soon would
dear-bought experience proclaim that when a people or family so divide, it never
fails to be against themselves. PUBLIUS.
FEDERALIST No. 5
The Same Subject
Continued (Concerning Dangers From Foreign Force and Influence)
For the Independent Journal.
JAY
To the People of the State of New York:
QUEEN ANNE, in her letter of the
1st July, 1706, to the Scotch Parliament, makes some observations on the
importance of the UNION then forming between England and Scotland, which merit
our attention. I shall present the public with one or two extracts from it: ``An
entire and perfect union will be the solid foundation of lasting peace: It will
secure your religion, liberty, and property; remove the animosities amongst
yourselves, and the jealousies and differences betwixt our two kingdoms. It must
increase your strength, riches, and trade; and by this union the whole island,
being joined in affection and free from all apprehensions of different interest,
will be ENABLED TO RESIST ALL ITS ENEMIES.'' ``We most earnestly recommend to
you calmness and unanimity in this great and weighty affair, that the union may
be brought to a happy conclusion, being the only EFFECTUAL way to secure our
present and future happiness, and disappoint the designs of our and your
enemies, who will doubtless, on this occasion, USE THEIR UTMOST ENDEAVORS TO
PREVENT OR DELAY THIS UNION.'' It was remarked in the preceding paper, that
weakness and divisions at home would invite dangers from abroad; and that
nothing would tend more to secure us from them than union, strength, and good
government within ourselves. This subject is copious and cannot easily be
exhausted. The history of Great Britain is the one with which we are in general
the best acquainted, and it gives us many useful lessons. We may profit by their
experience without paying the price which it cost them. Although it seems
obvious to common sense that the people of such an island should be but one
nation, yet we find that they were for ages divided into three, and that those
three were almost constantly embroiled in quarrels and wars with one another.
Notwithstanding their true interest with respect to the continental nations was
really the same, yet by the arts and policy and practices of those nations,
their mutual jealousies were perpetually kept inflamed, and for a long series of
years they were far more inconvenient and troublesome than they were useful and
assisting to each other. Should the people of America divide themselves into
three or four nations, would not the same thing happen? Would not similar
jealousies arise, and be in like manner cherished? Instead of their being
``joined in affection'' and free from all apprehension of different
``interests,'' envy and jealousy would soon extinguish confidence and affection,
and the partial interests of each confederacy, instead of the general interests
of all America, would be the only objects of their policy and pursuits. Hence,
like most other BORDERING nations, they would always be either involved in
disputes and war, or live in the constant apprehension of them. The most
sanguine advocates for three or four confederacies cannot reasonably suppose
that they would long remain exactly on an equal footing in point of strength,
even if it was possible to form them so at first; but, admitting that to be
practicable, yet what human contrivance can secure the continuance of such
equality? Independent of those local circumstances which tend to beget and
increase power in one part and to impede its progress in another, we must advert
to the effects of that superior policy and good management which would probably
distinguish the government of one above the rest, and by which their relative
equality in strength and consideration would be destroyed. For it cannot be
presumed that the same degree of sound policy, prudence, and foresight would
uniformly be observed by each of these confederacies for a long succession of
years. Whenever, and from whatever causes, it might happen, and happen it would,
that any one of these nations or confederacies should rise on the scale of
political importance much above the degree of her neighbors, that moment would
those neighbors behold her with envy and with fear. Both those passions would
lead them to countenance, if not to promote, whatever might promise to diminish
her importance; and would also restrain them from measures calculated to advance
or even to secure her prosperity. Much time would not be necessary to enable her
to discern these unfriendly dispositions. She would soon begin, not only to lose
confidence in her neighbors, but also to feel a disposition equally unfavorable
to them. Distrust naturally creates distrust, and by nothing is good-will and
kind conduct more speedily changed than by invidious jealousies and uncandid
imputations, whether expressed or implied. The North is generally the region of
strength, and many local circumstances render it probable that the most Northern
of the proposed confederacies would, at a period not very distant, be
unquestionably more formidable than any of the others. No sooner would this
become evident than the NORTHERN HIVE would excite the same ideas and sensations
in the more southern parts of America which it formerly did in the southern
parts of Europe. Nor does it appear to be a rash conjecture that its young
swarms might often be tempted to gather honey in the more blooming fields and
milder air of their luxurious and more delicate neighbors. They who well
consider the history of similar divisions and confederacies will find abundant
reason to apprehend that those in contemplation would in no other sense be
neighbors than as they would be borderers; that they would neither love nor
trust one another, but on the contrary would be a prey to discord, jealousy, and
mutual injuries; in short, that they would place us exactly in the situations in
which some nations doubtless wish to see us, viz., FORMIDABLE ONLY TO EACH
OTHER. From these considerations it appears that those gentlemen are greatly
mistaken who suppose that alliances offensive and defensive might be formed
between these confederacies, and would produce that combination and union of
wills of arms and of resources, which would be necessary to put and keep them in
a formidable state of defense against foreign enemies. When did the independent
states, into which Britain and Spain were formerly divided, combine in such
alliance, or unite their forces against a foreign enemy? The proposed
confederacies will be DISTINCT NATIONS. Each of them would have its commerce
with foreigners to regulate by distinct treaties; and as their productions and
commodities are different and proper for different markets, so would those
treaties be essentially different. Different commercial concerns must create
different interests, and of course different degrees of political attachment to
and connection with different foreign nations. Hence it might and probably would
happen that the foreign nation with whom the SOUTHERN confederacy might be at
war would be the one with whom the NORTHERN confederacy would be the most
desirous of preserving peace and friendship. An alliance so contrary to their
immediate interest would not therefore be easy to form, nor, if formed, would it
be observed and fulfilled with perfect good faith. Nay, it is far more probable
that in America, as in Europe, neighboring nations, acting under the impulse of
opposite interests and unfriendly passions, would frequently be found taking
different sides. Considering our distance from Europe, it would be more natural
for these confederacies to apprehend danger from one another than from distant
nations, and therefore that each of them should be more desirous to guard
against the others by the aid of foreign alliances, than to guard against
foreign dangers by alliances between themselves. And here let us not forget how
much more easy it is to receive foreign fleets into our ports, and foreign
armies into our country, than it is to persuade or compel them to depart. How
many conquests did the Romans and others make in the characters of allies, and
what innovations did they under the same character introduce into the
governments of those whom they pretended to protect. Let candid men judge, then,
whether the division of America into any given number of independent
sovereignties would tend to secure us against the hostilities and improper
interference of foreign nations. PUBLIUS.
FEDERALIST No. 6
Concerning Dangers
from Dissensions Between the States
For the Independent
Journal.
HAMILTON
To the People of the State of New York:
THE three last numbers of this
paper have been dedicated to an enumeration of the dangers to which we should be
exposed, in a state of disunion, from the arms and arts of foreign nations. I
shall now proceed to delineate dangers of a different and, perhaps, still more
alarming kind--those which will in all probability flow from dissensions between
the States themselves, and from domestic factions and convulsions. These have
been already in some instances slightly anticipated; but they deserve a more
particular and more full investigation. A man must be far gone in Utopian
speculations who can seriously doubt that, if these States should either be
wholly disunited, or only united in partial confederacies, the subdivisions into
which they might be thrown would have frequent and violent contests with each
other. To presume a want of motives for such contests as an argument against
their existence, would be to forget that men are ambitious, vindictive, and
rapacious. To look for a continuation of harmony between a number of
independent, unconnected sovereignties in the same neighborhood, would be to
disregard the uniform course of human events, and to set at defiance the
accumulated experience of ages. The causes of hostility among nations are
innumerable. There are some which have a general and almost constant operation
upon the collective bodies of society. Of this description are the love of power
or the desire of pre-eminence and dominion--the jealousy of power, or the desire
of equality and safety. There are others which have a more circumscribed though
an equally operative influence within their spheres. Such are the rivalships and
competitions of commerce between commercial nations. And there are others, not
less numerous than either of the former, which take their origin entirely in
private passions; in the attachments, enmities, interests, hopes, and fears of
leading individuals in the communities of which they are members. Men of this
class, whether the favorites of a king or of a people, have in too many
instances abused the confidence they possessed; and assuming the pretext of some
public motive, have not scrupled to sacrifice the national tranquillity to
personal advantage or personal gratification. The celebrated Pericles, in
compliance with the resentment of a prostitute,1 at the expense of much of the
blood and treasure of his countrymen, attacked, vanquished, and destroyed the
city of the SAMNIANS. The same man, stimulated by private pique against the
MEGARENSIANS,2 another nation of Greece, or to avoid a prosecution with which he
was threatened as an accomplice of a supposed theft of the statuary Phidias,3 or
to get rid of the accusations prepared to be brought against him for dissipating
the funds of the state in the purchase of popularity,4 or from a combination of
all these causes, was the primitive author of that famous and fatal war,
distinguished in the Grecian annals by the name of the PELOPONNESIAN war; which,
after various vicissitudes, intermissions, and renewals, terminated in the ruin
of the Athenian commonwealth. The ambitious cardinal, who was prime minister to
Henry VIII., permitting his vanity to aspire to the triple crown,5 entertained
hopes of succeeding in the acquisition of that splendid prize by the influence
of the Emperor Charles V. To secure the favor and interest of this enterprising
and powerful monarch, he precipitated England into a war with France, contrary
to the plainest dictates of policy, and at the hazard of the safety and
independence, as well of the kingdom over which he presided by his counsels, as
of Europe in general. For if there ever was a sovereign who bid fair to realize
the project of universal monarchy, it was the Emperor Charles V., of whose
intrigues Wolsey was at once the instrument and the dupe. The influence which
the bigotry of one female,6 the petulance of another,7 and the cabals of a
third,8 had in the contemporary policy, ferments, and pacifications, of a
considerable part of Europe, are topics that have been too often descanted upon
not to be generally known. To multiply examples of the agency of personal
considerations in the production of great national events, either foreign or
domestic, according to their direction, would be an unnecessary waste of time.
Those who have but a superficial acquaintance with the sources from which they
are to be drawn, will themselves recollect a variety of instances; and those who
have a tolerable knowledge of human nature will not stand in need of such lights
to form their opinion either of the reality or extent of that agency. Perhaps,
however, a reference, tending to illustrate the general principle, may with
propriety be made to a case which has lately happened among ourselves. If Shays
had not been a DESPERATE DEBTOR, it is much to be doubted whether Massachusetts
would have been plunged into a civil war. But notwithstanding the concurring
testimony of experience, in this particular, there are still to be found
visionary or designing men, who stand ready to advocate the paradox of perpetual
peace between the States, though dismembered and alienated from each other. The
genius of republics (say they) is pacific; the spirit of commerce has a tendency
to soften the manners of men, and to extinguish those inflammable humors which
have so often kindled into wars. Commercial republics, like ours, will never be
disposed to waste themselves in ruinous contentions with each other. They will
be governed by mutual interest, and will cultivate a spirit of mutual amity and
concord. Is it not (we may ask these projectors in politics) the true interest
of all nations to cultivate the same benevolent and philosophic spirit? If this
be their true interest, have they in fact pursued it? Has it not, on the
contrary, invariably been found that momentary passions, and immediate interest,
have a more active and imperious control over human conduct than general or
remote considerations of policy, utility or justice? Have republics in practice
been less addicted to war than monarchies? Are not the former administered by
MEN as well as the latter? Are there not aversions, predilections, rivalships,
and desires of unjust acquisitions, that affect nations as well as kings? Are
not popular assemblies frequently subject to the impulses of rage, resentment,
jealousy, avarice, and of other irregular and violent propensities? Is it not
well known that their determinations are often governed by a few individuals in
whom they place confidence, and are, of course, liable to be tinctured by the
passions and views of those individuals? Has commerce hitherto done anything
more than change the objects of war? Is not the love of wealth as domineering
and enterprising a passion as that of power or glory? Have there not been as
many wars founded upon commercial motives since that has become the prevailing
system of nations, as were before occasioned by the cupidity of territory or
dominion? Has not the spirit of commerce, in many instances, administered new
incentives to the appetite, both for the one and for the other? Let experience,
the least fallible guide of human opinions, be appealed to for an answer to
these inquiries. Sparta, Athens, Rome, and Carthage were all republics; two of
them, Athens and Carthage, of the commercial kind. Yet were they as often
engaged in wars, offensive and defensive, as the neighboring monarchies of the
same times. Sparta was little better than a wellregulated camp; and Rome was
never sated of carnage and conquest. Carthage, though a commercial republic, was
the aggressor in the very war that ended in her destruction. Hannibal had
carried her arms into the heart of Italy and to the gates of Rome, before
Scipio, in turn, gave him an overthrow in the territories of Carthage, and made
a conquest of the commonwealth. Venice, in later times, figured more than once
in wars of ambition, till, becoming an object to the other Italian states, Pope
Julius II. found means to accomplish that formidable league,9 which gave a
deadly blow to the power and pride of this haughty republic. The provinces of
Holland, till they were overwhelmed in debts and taxes, took a leading and
conspicuous part in the wars of Europe. They had furious contests with England
for the dominion of the sea, and were among the most persevering and most
implacable of the opponents of Louis XIV. In the government of Britain the
representatives of the people compose one branch of the national legislature.
Commerce has been for ages the predominant pursuit of that country. Few nations,
nevertheless, have been more frequently engaged in war; and the wars in which
that kingdom has been engaged have, in numerous instances, proceeded from the
people. There have been, if I may so express it, almost as many popular as royal
wars. The cries of the nation and the importunities of their representatives
have, upon various occasions, dragged their monarchs into war, or continued them
in it, contrary to their inclinations, and sometimes contrary to the real
interests of the State. In that memorable struggle for superiority between the
rival houses of AUSTRIA and BOURBON, which so long kept Europe in a flame, it is
well known that the antipathies of the English against the French, seconding the
ambition, or rather the avarice, of a favorite leader,10 protracted the war
beyond the limits marked out by sound policy, and for a considerable time in
opposition to the views of the court. The wars of these two last-mentioned
nations have in a great measure grown out of commercial considerations,--the
desire of supplanting and the fear of being supplanted, either in particular
branches of traffic or in the general advantages of trade and navigation. From
this summary of what has taken place in other countries, whose situations have
borne the nearest resemblance to our own, what reason can we have to confide in
those reveries which would seduce us into an expectation of peace and cordiality
between the members of the present confederacy, in a state of separation? Have
we not already seen enough of the fallacy and extravagance of those idle
theories which have amused us with promises of an exemption from the
imperfections, weaknesses and evils incident to society in every shape? Is it
not time to awake from the deceitful dream of a golden age, and to adopt as a
practical maxim for the direction of our political conduct that we, as well as
the other inhabitants of the globe, are yet remote from the happy empire of
perfect wisdom and perfect virtue? Let the point of extreme depression to which
our national dignity and credit have sunk, let the inconveniences felt
everywhere from a lax and ill administration of government, let the revolt of a
part of the State of North Carolina, the late menacing disturbances in
Pennsylvania, and the actual insurrections and rebellions in Massachusetts,
declare--! So far is the general sense of mankind from corresponding with the
tenets of those who endeavor to lull asleep our apprehensions of discord and
hostility between the States, in the event of disunion, that it has from long
observation of the progress of society become a sort of axiom in politics, that
vicinity or nearness of situation, constitutes nations natural enemies. An
intelligent writer expresses himself on this subject to this effect:
``NEIGHBORING NATIONS (says he) are naturally enemies of each other unless their
common weakness forces them to league in a CONFEDERATE REPUBLIC, and their
constitution prevents the differences that neighborhood occasions, extinguishing
that secret jealousy which disposes all states to aggrandize themselves at the
expense of their neighbors.''11 This passage, at the same time, points out the
EVIL and suggests the REMEDY. PUBLIUS.
1 Aspasia, vide
``Plutarch's Life of Pericles.''
2 Ibid.
3 Ibid.
4 Ibid. Phidias was
supposed to have stolen some public gold, with the connivance of Pericles, for
the embellishment of the statue of Minerva.
5 P Worn by
the popes.
6 Madame de Maintenon.
7 Duchess of Marlborough.
8 Madame
de Pompadour.
9 The League of Cambray, comprehending
the Emperor, the King of France, the King of Aragon, and most of the Italian
princes and states.
10 The Duke of Marlborough.
11 Vide ``Principes des Negociations'' par 1'Abbe de Mably.
FEDERALIST. No. 7
The Same Subject Continued (Concerning Dangers from
Dissensions Between the States)
For the Independent Journal.
HAMILTON
To the People of the State of New York:
IT IS sometimes asked, with an air of seeming triumph, what
inducements could the States have, if disunited, to make war upon each other? It
would be a full answer to this question to say--precisely the same inducements
which have, at different times, deluged in blood all the nations in the world.
But, unfortunately for us, the question admits of a more particular answer.
There are causes of differences within our immediate contemplation, of the
tendency of which, even under the restraints of a federal constitution, we have
had sufficient experience to enable us to form a judgment of what might be
expected if those restraints were removed. Territorial disputes have at all
times been found one of the most fertile sources of hostility among nations.
Perhaps the greatest proportion of wars that have desolated the earth have
sprung from this origin. This cause would exist among us in full force. We have
a vast tract of unsettled territory within the boundaries of the United States.
There still are discordant and undecided claims between several of them, and the
dissolution of the Union would lay a foundation for similar claims between them
all. It is well known that they have heretofore had serious and animated
discussion concerning the rights to the lands which were ungranted at the time
of the Revolution, and which usually went under the name of crown lands. The
States within the limits of whose colonial governments they were comprised have
claimed them as their property, the others have contended that the rights of the
crown in this article devolved upon the Union; especially as to all that part of
the Western territory which, either by actual possession, or through the
submission of the Indian proprietors, was subjected to the jurisdiction of the
king of Great Britain, till it was relinquished in the treaty of peace. This, it
has been said, was at all events an acquisition to the Confederacy by compact
with a foreign power. It has been the prudent policy of Congress to appease this
controversy, by prevailing upon the States to make cessions to the United States
for the benefit of the whole. This has been so far accomplished as, under a
continuation of the Union, to afford a decided prospect of an amicable
termination of the dispute. A dismemberment of the Confederacy, however, would
revive this dispute, and would create others on the same subject. At present, a
large part of the vacant Western territory is, by cession at least, if not by
any anterior right, the common property of the Union. If that were at an end,
the States which made the cession, on a principle of federal compromise, would
be apt when the motive of the grant had ceased, to reclaim the lands as a
reversion. The other States would no doubt insist on a proportion, by right of
representation. Their argument would be, that a grant, once made, could not be
revoked; and that the justice of participating in territory acquired or secured
by the joint efforts of the Confederacy, remained undiminished. If, contrary to
probability, it should be admitted by all the States, that each had a right to a
share of this common stock, there would still be a difficulty to be surmounted,
as to a proper rule of apportionment. Different principles would be set up by
different States for this purpose; and as they would affect the opposite
interests of the parties, they might not easily be susceptible of a pacific
adjustment. In the wide field of Western territory, therefore, we perceive an
ample theatre for hostile pretensions, without any umpire or common judge to
interpose between the contending parties. To reason from the past to the future,
we shall have good ground to apprehend, that the sword would sometimes be
appealed to as the arbiter of their differences. The circumstances of the
dispute between Connecticut and Pennsylvania, respecting the land at Wyoming,
admonish us not to be sanguine in expecting an easy accommodation of such
differences. The articles of confederation obliged the parties to submit the
matter to the decision of a federal court. The submission was made, and the
court decided in favor of Pennsylvania. But Connecticut gave strong indications
of dissatisfaction with that determination; nor did she appear to be entirely
resigned to it, till, by negotiation and management, something like an
equivalent was found for the loss she supposed herself to have sustained.
Nothing here said is intended to convey the slightest censure on the conduct of
that State. She no doubt sincerely believed herself to have been injured by the
decision; and States, like individuals, acquiesce with great reluctance in
determinations to their disadvantage. Those who had an opportunity of seeing the
inside of the transactions which attended the progress of the controversy
between this State and the district of Vermont, can vouch the opposition we
experienced, as well from States not interested as from those which were
interested in the claim; and can attest the danger to which the peace of the
Confederacy might have been exposed, had this State attempted to assert its
rights by force. Two motives preponderated in that opposition: one, a jealousy
entertained of our future power; and the other, the interest of certain
individuals of influence in the neighboring States, who had obtained grants of
lands under the actual government of that district. Even the States which
brought forward claims, in contradiction to ours, seemed more solicitous to
dismember this State, than to establish their own pretensions. These were New
Hampshire, Massachusetts, and Connecticut. New Jersey and Rhode Island, upon all
occasions, discovered a warm zeal for the independence of Vermont; and Maryland,
till alarmed by the appearance of a connection between Canada and that State,
entered deeply into the same views. These being small States, saw with an
unfriendly eye the perspective of our growing greatness. In a review of these
transactions we may trace some of the causes which would be likely to embroil
the States with each other, if it should be their unpropitious destiny to become
disunited. The competitions of commerce would be another fruitful source of
contention. The States less favorably circumstanced would be desirous of
escaping from the disadvantages of local situation, and of sharing in the
advantages of their more fortunate neighbors. Each State, or separate
confederacy, would pursue a system of commercial policy peculiar to itself. This
would occasion distinctions, preferences, and exclusions, which would beget
discontent. The habits of intercourse, on the basis of equal privileges, to
which we have been accustomed since the earliest settlement of the country,
would give a keener edge to those causes of discontent than they would naturally
have independent of this circumstance. WE SHOULD BE READY TO DENOMINATE INJURIES
THOSE THINGS WHICH WERE IN REALITY THE JUSTIFIABLE ACTS OF INDEPENDENT
SOVEREIGNTIES CONSULTING A DISTINCT INTEREST. The spirit of enterprise, which
characterizes the commercial part of America, has left no occasion of displaying
itself unimproved. It is not at all probable that this unbridled spirit would
pay much respect to those regulations of trade by which particular States might
endeavor to secure exclusive benefits to their own citizens. The infractions of
these regulations, on one side, the efforts to prevent and repel them, on the
other, would naturally lead to outrages, and these to reprisals and wars. The
opportunities which some States would have of rendering others tributary to them
by commercial regulations would be impatiently submitted to by the tributary
States. The relative situation of New York, Connecticut, and New Jersey would
afford an example of this kind. New York, from the necessities of revenue, must
lay duties on her importations. A great part of these duties must be paid by the
inhabitants of the two other States in the capacity of consumers of what we
import. New York would neither be willing nor able to forego this advantage. Her
citizens would not consent that a duty paid by them should be remitted in favor
of the citizens of her neighbors; nor would it be practicable, if there were not
this impediment in the way, to distinguish the customers in our own markets.
Would Connecticut and New Jersey long submit to be taxed by New York for her
exclusive benefit? Should we be long permitted to remain in the quiet and
undisturbed enjoyment of a metropolis, from the possession of which we derived
an advantage so odious to our neighbors, and, in their opinion, so oppressive?
Should we be able to preserve it against the incumbent weight of Connecticut on
the one side, and the co-operating pressure of New Jersey on the other? These
are questions that temerity alone will answer in the affirmative. The public
debt of the Union would be a further cause of collision between the separate
States or confederacies. The apportionment, in the first instance, and the
progressive extinguishment afterward, would be alike productive of ill-humor and
animosity. How would it be possible to agree upon a rule of apportionment
satisfactory to all? There is scarcely any that can be proposed which is
entirely free from real objections. These, as usual, would be exaggerated by the
adverse interest of the parties. There are even dissimilar views among the
States as to the general principle of discharging the public debt. Some of them,
either less impressed with the importance of national credit, or because their
citizens have little, if any, immediate interest in the question, feel an
indifference, if not a repugnance, to the payment of the domestic debt at any
rate. These would be inclined to magnify the difficulties of a distribution.
Others of them, a numerous body of whose citizens are creditors to the public
beyond proportion of the State in the total amount of the national debt, would
be strenuous for some equitable and effective provision. The procrastinations of
the former would excite the resentments of the latter. The settlement of a rule
would, in the meantime, be postponed by real differences of opinion and affected
delays. The citizens of the States interested would clamour; foreign powers
would urge for the satisfaction of their just demands, and the peace of the
States would be hazarded to the double contingency of external invasion and
internal contention. Suppose the difficulties of agreeing upon a rule
surmounted, and the apportionment made. Still there is great room to suppose
that the rule agreed upon would, upon experiment, be found to bear harder upon
some States than upon others. Those which were sufferers by it would naturally
seek for a mitigation of the burden. The others would as naturally be
disinclined to a revision, which was likely to end in an increase of their own
incumbrances. Their refusal would be too plausible a pretext to the complaining
States to withhold their contributions, not to be embraced with avidity; and the
non-compliance of these States with their engagements would be a ground of
bitter discussion and altercation. If even the rule adopted should in practice
justify the equality of its principle, still delinquencies in payments on the
part of some of the States would result from a diversity of other causes--the
real deficiency of resources; the mismanagement of their finances; accidental
disorders in the management of the government; and, in addition to the rest, the
reluctance with which men commonly part with money for purposes that have
outlived the exigencies which produced them, and interfere with the supply of
immediate wants. Delinquencies, from whatever causes, would be productive of
complaints, recriminations, and quarrels. There is, perhaps, nothing more likely
to disturb the tranquillity of nations than their being bound to mutual
contributions for any common object that does not yield an equal and coincident
benefit. For it is an observation, as true as it is trite, that there is nothing
men differ so readily about as the payment of money. Laws in violation of
private contracts, as they amount to aggressions on the rights of those States
whose citizens are injured by them, may be considered as another probable source
of hostility. We are not authorized to expect that a more liberal or more
equitable spirit would preside over the legislations of the individual States
hereafter, if unrestrained by any additional checks, than we have heretofore
seen in too many instances disgracing their several codes. We have observed the
disposition to retaliation excited in Connecticut in consequence of the
enormities perpetrated by the Legislature of Rhode Island; and we reasonably
infer that, in similar cases, under other circumstances, a war, not of
PARCHMENT, but of the sword, would chastise such atrocious breaches of moral
obligation and social justice. The probability of incompatible alliances between
the different States or confederacies and different foreign nations, and the
effects of this situation upon the peace of the whole, have been sufficiently
unfolded in some preceding papers. From the view they have exhibited of this
part of the subject, this conclusion is to be drawn, that America, if not
connected at all, or only by the feeble tie of a simple league, offensive and
defensive, would, by the operation of such jarring alliances, be gradually
entangled in all the pernicious labyrinths of European politics and wars; and by
the destructive contentions of the parts into which she was divided, would be
likely to become a prey to the artifices and machinations of powers equally the
enemies of them all. Divide et impera1 must be the motto of every nation that
either hates or fears us.2 PUBLIUS. 1 Divide and command. 2 In order that the
whole subject of these papers may as soon as possible be laid before the public,
it is proposed to publish them four times a week--on Tuesday in the New York
Packet and on Thursday in the Daily Advertiser.
FEDERALIST No. 8
The Consequences
of Hostilities Between the States
From the New York
Packet. Tuesday, November 20, 1787.
HAMILTON
To the People of the
State of New York:
ASSUMING it therefore as an
established truth that the several States, in case of disunion, or such
combinations of them as might happen to be formed out of the wreck of the
general Confederacy, would be subject to those vicissitudes of peace and war, of
friendship and enmity, with each other, which have fallen to the lot of all
neighboring nations not united under one government, let us enter into a concise
detail of some of the consequences that would attend such a situation. War
between the States, in the first period of their separate existence, would be
accompanied with much greater distresses than it commonly is in those countries
where regular military establishments have long obtained. The disciplined armies
always kept on foot on the continent of Europe, though they bear a malignant
aspect to liberty and economy, have, notwithstanding, been productive of the
signal advantage of rendering sudden conquests impracticable, and of preventing
that rapid desolation which used to mark the progress of war prior to their
introduction. The art of fortification has contributed to the same ends. The
nations of Europe are encircled with chains of fortified places, which mutually
obstruct invasion. Campaigns are wasted in reducing two or three frontier
garrisons, to gain admittance into an enemy's country. Similar impediments occur
at every step, to exhaust the strength and delay the progress of an invader.
Formerly, an invading army would penetrate into the heart of a neighboring
country almost as soon as intelligence of its approach could be received; but
now a comparatively small force of disciplined troops, acting on the defensive,
with the aid of posts, is able to impede, and finally to frustrate, the
enterprises of one much more considerable. The history of war, in that quarter
of the globe, is no longer a history of nations subdued and empires overturned,
but of towns taken and retaken; of battles that decide nothing; of retreats more
beneficial than victories; of much effort and little acquisition. In this
country the scene would be altogether reversed. The jealousy of military
establishments would postpone them as long as possible. The want of
fortifications, leaving the frontiers of one state open to another, would
facilitate inroads. The populous States would, with little difficulty, overrun
their less populous neighbors. Conquests would be as easy to be made as
difficult to be retained. War, therefore, would be desultory and predatory.
PLUNDER and devastation ever march in the train of irregulars. The calamities of
individuals would make the principal figure in the events which would
characterize our military exploits. This picture is not too highly wrought;
though, I confess, it would not long remain a just one. Safety from external
danger is the most powerful director of national conduct. Even the ardent love
of liberty will, after a time, give way to its dictates. The violent destruction
of life and property incident to war, the continual effort and alarm attendant
on a state of continual danger, will compel nations the most attached to liberty
to resort for repose and security to institutions which have a tendency to
destroy their civil and political rights. To be more safe, they at length become
willing to run the risk of being less free. The institutions chiefly alluded to
are STANDING ARMIES and the correspondent appendages of military establishments.
Standing armies, it is said, are not provided against in the new Constitution;
and it is therefore inferred that they may exist under it.1 Their existence,
however, from the very terms of the proposition, is, at most, problematical and
uncertain. But standing armies, it may be replied, must inevitably result from a
dissolution of the Confederacy. Frequent war and constant apprehension, which
require a state of as constant preparation, will infallibly produce them. The
weaker States or confederacies would first have recourse to them, to put
themselves upon an equality with their more potent neighbors. They would
endeavor to supply the inferiority of population and resources by a more regular
and effective system of defense, by disciplined troops, and by fortifications.
They would, at the same time, be necessitated to strengthen the executive arm of
government, in doing which their constitutions would acquire a progressive
direction toward monarchy. It is of the nature of war to increase the executive
at the expense of the legislative authority. The expedients which have been
mentioned would soon give the States or confederacies that made use of them a
superiority over their neighbors. Small states, or states of less natural
strength, under vigorous governments, and with the assistance of disciplined
armies, have often triumphed over large states, or states of greater natural
strength, which have been destitute of these advantages. Neither the pride nor
the safety of the more important States or confederacies would permit them long
to submit to this mortifying and adventitious superiority. They would quickly
resort to means similar to those by which it had been effected, to reinstate
themselves in their lost pre-eminence. Thus, we should, in a little time, see
established in every part of this country the same engines of despotism which
have been the scourge of the Old World. This, at least, would be the natural
course of things; and our reasonings will be the more likely to be just, in
proportion as they are accommodated to this standard. These are not vague
inferences drawn from supposed or speculative defects in a Constitution, the
whole power of which is lodged in the hands of a people, or their
representatives and delegates, but they are solid conclusions, drawn from the
natural and necessary progress of human affairs. It may, perhaps, be asked, by
way of objection to this, why did not standing armies spring up out of the
contentions which so often distracted the ancient republics of Greece? Different
answers, equally satisfactory, may be given to this question. The industrious
habits of the people of the present day, absorbed in the pursuits of gain, and
devoted to the improvements of agriculture and commerce, are incompatible with
the condition of a nation of soldiers, which was the true condition of the
people of those republics. The means of revenue, which have been so greatly
multiplied by the increase of gold and silver and of the arts of industry, and
the science of finance, which is the offspring of modern times, concurring with
the habits of nations, have produced an entire revolution in the system of war,
and have rendered disciplined armies, distinct from the body of the citizens,
the inseparable companions of frequent hostility. There is a wide difference,
also, between military establishments in a country seldom exposed by its
situation to internal invasions, and in one which is often subject to them, and
always apprehensive of them. The rulers of the former can have a good pretext,
if they are even so inclined, to keep on foot armies so numerous as must of
necessity be maintained in the latter. These armies being, in the first case,
rarely, if at all, called into activity for interior defense, the people are in
no danger of being broken to military subordination. The laws are not accustomed
to relaxations, in favor of military exigencies; the civil state remains in full
vigor, neither corrupted, nor confounded with the principles or propensities of
the other state. The smallness of the army renders the natural strength of the
community an over-match for it; and the citizens, not habituated to look up to
the military power for protection, or to submit to its oppressions, neither love
nor fear the soldiery; they view them with a spirit of jealous acquiescence in a
necessary evil, and stand ready to resist a power which they suppose may be
exerted to the prejudice of their rights. The army under such circumstances may
usefully aid the magistrate to suppress a small faction, or an occasional mob,
or insurrection; but it will be unable to enforce encroachments against the
united efforts of the great body of the people. In a country in the predicament
last described, the contrary of all this happens. The perpetual menacings of
danger oblige the government to be always prepared to repel it; its armies must
be numerous enough for instant defense. The continual necessity for their
services enhances the importance of the soldier, and proportionably degrades the
condition of the citizen. The military state becomes elevated above the civil.
The inhabitants of territories, often the theatre of war, are unavoidably
subjected to frequent infringements on their rights, which serve to weaken their
sense of those rights; and by degrees the people are brought to consider the
soldiery not only as their protectors, but as their superiors. The transition
from this disposition to that of considering them masters, is neither remote nor
difficult; but it is very difficult to prevail upon a people under such
impressions, to make a bold or effectual resistance to usurpations supported by
the military power. The kingdom of Great Britain falls within the first
description. An insular situation, and a powerful marine, guarding it in a great
measure against the possibility of foreign invasion, supersede the necessity of
a numerous army within the kingdom. A sufficient force to make head against a
sudden descent, till the militia could have time to rally and embody, is all
that has been deemed requisite. No motive of national policy has demanded, nor
would public opinion have tolerated, a larger number of troops upon its domestic
establishment. There has been, for a long time past, little room for the
operation of the other causes, which have been enumerated as the consequences of
internal war. This peculiar felicity of situation has, in a great degree,
contributed to preserve the liberty which that country to this day enjoys, in
spite of the prevalent venality and corruption. If, on the contrary, Britain had
been situated on the continent, and had been compelled, as she would have been,
by that situation, to make her military establishments at home coextensive with
those of the other great powers of Europe, she, like them, would in all
probability be, at this day, a victim to the absolute power of a single man. 'T
is possible, though not easy, that the people of that island may be enslaved
from other causes; but it cannot be by the prowess of an army so inconsiderable
as that which has been usually kept up within the kingdom. If we are wise enough
to preserve the Union we may for ages enjoy an advantage similar to that of an
insulated situation. Europe is at a great distance from us. Her colonies in our
vicinity will be likely to continue too much disproportioned in strength to be
able to give us any dangerous annoyance. Extensive military establishments
cannot, in this position, be necessary to our security. But if we should be
disunited, and the integral parts should either remain separated, or, which is
most probable, should be thrown together into two or three confederacies, we
should be, in a short course of time, in the predicament of the continental
powers of Europe --our liberties would be a prey to the means of defending
ourselves against the ambition and jealousy of each other. This is an idea not
superficial or futile, but solid and weighty. It deserves the most serious and
mature consideration of every prudent and honest man of whatever party. If such
men will make a firm and solemn pause, and meditate dispassionately on the
importance of this interesting idea; if they will contemplate it in all its
attitudes, and trace it to all its consequences, they will not hesitate to part
with trivial objections to a Constitution, the rejection of which would in all
probability put a final period to the Union. The airy phantoms that flit before
the distempered imaginations of some of its adversaries would quickly give place
to the more substantial forms of dangers, real, certain, and formidable.
PUBLIUS.
1 This objection will be fully examined in its
proper place, and it will be shown that the only natural precaution which could
have been taken on this subject has been taken; and a much better one than is to
be found in any constitution that has been heretofore framed in America, most of
which contain no guard at all on this subject.
FEDERALIST No. 9
The Union as a
Safeguard Against Domestic Faction and Insurrection
For the Independent Journal.
HAMILTON
To the People of the
State of New York:
A FIRM Union will be of the utmost
moment to the peace and liberty of the States, as a barrier against domestic
faction and insurrection. It is impossible to read the history of the petty
republics of Greece and Italy without feeling sensations of horror and disgust
at the distractions with which they were continually agitated, and at the rapid
succession of revolutions by which they were kept in a state of perpetual
vibration between the extremes of tyranny and anarchy. If they exhibit
occasional calms, these only serve as short-lived contrast to the furious storms
that are to succeed. If now and then intervals of felicity open to view, we
behold them with a mixture of regret, arising from the reflection that the
pleasing scenes before us are soon to be overwhelmed by the tempestuous waves of
sedition and party rage. If momentary rays of glory break forth from the gloom,
while they dazzle us with a transient and fleeting brilliancy, they at the same
time admonish us to lament that the vices of government should pervert the
direction and tarnish the lustre of those bright talents and exalted endowments
for which the favored soils that produced them have been so justly celebrated.
From the disorders that disfigure the annals of those republics the advocates of
despotism have drawn arguments, not only against the forms of republican
government, but against the very principles of civil liberty. They have decried
all free government as inconsistent with the order of society, and have indulged
themselves in malicious exultation over its friends and partisans. Happily for
mankind, stupendous fabrics reared on the basis of liberty, which have
flourished for ages, have, in a few glorious instances, refuted their gloomy
sophisms. And, I trust, America will be the broad and solid foundation of other
edifices, not less magnificent, which will be equally permanent monuments of
their errors. But it is not to be denied that the portraits they have sketched
of republican government were too just copies of the originals from which they
were taken. If it had been found impracticable to have devised models of a more
perfect structure, the enlightened friends to liberty would have been obliged to
abandon the cause of that species of government as indefensible. The science of
politics, however, like most other sciences, has received great improvement. The
efficacy of various principles is now well understood, which were either not
known at all, or imperfectly known to the ancients. The regular distribution of
power into distinct departments; the introduction of legislative balances and
checks; the institution of courts composed of judges holding their offices
during good behavior; the representation of the people in the legislature by
deputies of their own election: these are wholly new discoveries, or have made
their principal progress towards perfection in modern times. They are means, and
powerful means, by which the excellences of republican government may be
retained and its imperfections lessened or avoided. To this catalogue of
circumstances that tend to the amelioration of popular systems of civil
government, I shall venture, however novel it may appear to some, to add one
more, on a principle which has been made the foundation of an objection to the
new Constitution; I mean the ENLARGEMENT of the ORBIT within which such systems
are to revolve, either in respect to the dimensions of a single State or to the
consolidation of several smaller States into one great Confederacy. The latter
is that which immediately concerns the object under consideration. It will,
however, be of use to examine the principle in its application to a single
State, which shall be attended to in another place. The utility of a
Confederacy, as well to suppress faction and to guard the internal tranquillity
of States, as to increase their external force and security, is in reality not a
new idea. It has been practiced upon in different countries and ages, and has
received the sanction of the most approved writers on the subject of politics.
The opponents of the plan proposed have, with great assiduity, cited and
circulated the observations of Montesquieu on the necessity of a contracted
territory for a republican government. But they seem not to have been apprised
of the sentiments of that great man expressed in another part of his work, nor
to have adverted to the consequences of the principle to which they subscribe
with such ready acquiescence. When Montesquieu recommends a small extent for
republics, the standards he had in view were of dimensions far short of the
limits of almost every one of these States. Neither Virginia, Massachusetts,
Pennsylvania, New York, North Carolina, nor Georgia can by any means be compared
with the models from which he reasoned and to which the terms of his description
apply. If we therefore take his ideas on this point as the criterion of truth,
we shall be driven to the alternative either of taking refuge at once in the
arms of monarchy, or of splitting ourselves into an infinity of little, jealous,
clashing, tumultuous commonwealths, the wretched nurseries of unceasing discord,
and the miserable objects of universal pity or contempt. Some of the writers who
have come forward on the other side of the question seem to have been aware of
the dilemma; and have even been bold enough to hint at the division of the
larger States as a desirable thing. Such an infatuated policy, such a desperate
expedient, might, by the multiplication of petty offices, answer the views of
men who possess not qualifications to extend their influence beyond the narrow
circles of personal intrigue, but it could never promote the greatness or
happiness of the people of America. Referring the examination of the principle
itself to another place, as has been already mentioned, it will be sufficient to
remark here that, in the sense of the author who has been most emphatically
quoted upon the occasion, it would only dictate a reduction of the SIZE of the
more considerable MEMBERS of the Union, but would not militate against their
being all comprehended in one confederate government. And this is the true
question, in the discussion of which we are at present interested. So far are
the suggestions of Montesquieu from standing in opposition to a general Union of
the States, that he explicitly treats of a CONFEDERATE REPUBLIC as the expedient
for extending the sphere of popular government, and reconciling the advantages
of monarchy with those of republicanism. ``It is very probable,'' (says he1)
``that mankind would have been obliged at length to live constantly under the
government of a single person, had they not contrived a kind of constitution
that has all the internal advantages of a republican, together with the external
force of a monarchical government. I mean a CONFEDERATE REPUBLIC. ``This form of
government is a convention by which several smaller STATES agree to become
members of a larger ONE, which they intend to form. It is a kind of assemblage
of societies that constitute a new one, capable of increasing, by means of new
associations, till they arrive to such a degree of power as to be able to
provide for the security of the united body. ``A republic of this kind, able to
withstand an external force, may support itself without any internal
corruptions. The form of this society prevents all manner of inconveniences.
``If a single member should attempt to usurp the supreme authority, he could not
be supposed to have an equal authority and credit in all the confederate states.
Were he to have too great influence over one, this would alarm the rest. Were he
to subdue a part, that which would still remain free might oppose him with
forces independent of those which he had usurped and overpower him before he
could be settled in his usurpation. ``Should a popular insurrection happen in
one of the confederate states the others are able to quell it. Should abuses
creep into one part, they are reformed by those that remain sound. The state may
be destroyed on one side, and not on the other; the confederacy may be
dissolved, and the confederates preserve their sovereignty. ``As this government
is composed of small republics, it enjoys the internal happiness of each; and
with respect to its external situation, it is possessed, by means of the
association, of all the advantages of large monarchies.'' I have thought it
proper to quote at length these interesting passages, because they contain a
luminous abridgment of the principal arguments in favor of the Union, and must
effectually remove the false impressions which a misapplication of other parts
of the work was calculated to make. They have, at the same time, an intimate
connection with the more immediate design of this paper; which is, to illustrate
the tendency of the Union to repress domestic faction and insurrection. A
distinction, more subtle than accurate, has been raised between a CONFEDERACY
and a CONSOLIDATION of the States. The essential characteristic of the first is
said to be, the restriction of its authority to the members in their collective
capacities, without reaching to the individuals of whom they are composed. It is
contended that the national council ought to have no concern with any object of
internal administration. An exact equality of suffrage between the members has
also been insisted upon as a leading feature of a confederate government. These
positions are, in the main, arbitrary; they are supported neither by principle
nor precedent. It has indeed happened, that governments of this kind have
generally operated in the manner which the distinction taken notice of, supposes
to be inherent in their nature; but there have been in most of them extensive
exceptions to the practice, which serve to prove, as far as example will go,
that there is no absolute rule on the subject. And it will be clearly shown in
the course of this investigation that as far as the principle contended for has
prevailed, it has been the cause of incurable disorder and imbecility in the
government. The definition of a CONFEDERATE REPUBLIC seems simply to be ``an
assemblage of societies,'' or an association of two or more states into one
state. The extent, modifications, and objects of the federal authority are mere
matters of discretion. So long as the separate organization of the members be
not abolished; so long as it exists, by a constitutional necessity, for local
purposes; though it should be in perfect subordination to the general authority
of the union, it would still be, in fact and in theory, an association of
states, or a confederacy. The proposed Constitution, so far from implying an
abolition of the State governments, makes them constituent parts of the national
sovereignty, by allowing them a direct representation in the Senate, and leaves
in their possession certain exclusive and very important portions of sovereign
power. This fully corresponds, in every rational import of the terms, with the
idea of a federal government. In the Lycian confederacy, which consisted of
twenty-three CITIES or republics, the largest were entitled to THREE votes in
the COMMON COUNCIL, those of the middle class to TWO, and the smallest to ONE.
The COMMON COUNCIL had the appointment of all the judges and magistrates of the
respective CITIES. This was certainly the most, delicate species of interference
in their internal administration; for if there be any thing that seems
exclusively appropriated to the local jurisdictions, it is the appointment of
their own officers. Yet Montesquieu, speaking of this association, says: ``Were
I to give a model of an excellent Confederate Republic, it would be that of
Lycia.'' Thus we perceive that the distinctions insisted upon were not within
the contemplation of this enlightened civilian; and we shall be led to conclude,
that they are the novel refinements of an erroneous theory. PUBLIUS.
1 ``Spirit of Lawa,'' vol. i., book ix., chap. i.
FEDERALIST No. 10
The Same Subject Continued (The Union as a Safeguard
Against Domestic Faction and Insurrection)
From the New
York Packet. Friday, November 23, 1787.
MADISON
To the People of the State
of New York:
AMONG the numerous advantages promised by
a wellconstructed Union, none deserves to be more accurately developed than its
tendency to break and control the violence of faction. The friend of popular
governments never finds himself so much alarmed for their character and fate, as
when he contemplates their propensity to this dangerous vice. He will not fail,
therefore, to set a due value on any plan which, without violating the
principles to which he is attached, provides a proper cure for it. The
instability, injustice, and confusion introduced into the public councils, have,
in truth, been the mortal diseases under which popular governments have
everywhere perished; as they continue to be the favorite and fruitful topics
from which the adversaries to liberty derive their most specious declamations.
The valuable improvements made by the American constitutions on the popular
models, both ancient and modern, cannot certainly be too much admired; but it
would be an unwarrantable partiality, to contend that they have as effectually
obviated the danger on this side, as was wished and expected. Complaints are
everywhere heard from our most considerate and virtuous citizens, equally the
friends of public and private faith, and of public and personal liberty, that
our governments are too unstable, that the public good is disregarded in the
conflicts of rival parties, and that measures are too often decided, not
according to the rules of justice and the rights of the minor party, but by the
superior force of an interested and overbearing majority. However anxiously we
may wish that these complaints had no foundation, the evidence, of known facts
will not permit us to deny that they are in some degree true. It will be found,
indeed, on a candid review of our situation, that some of the distresses under
which we labor have been erroneously charged on the operation of our
governments; but it will be found, at the same time, that other causes will not
alone account for many of our heaviest misfortunes; and, particularly, for that
prevailing and increasing distrust of public engagements, and alarm for private
rights, which are echoed from one end of the continent to the other. These must
be chiefly, if not wholly, effects of the unsteadiness and injustice with which
a factious spirit has tainted our public administrations. By a faction, I
understand a number of citizens, whether amounting to a majority or a minority
of the whole, who are united and actuated by some common impulse of passion, or
of interest, adversed to the rights of other citizens, or to the permanent and
aggregate interests of the community. There are two methods of curing the
mischiefs of faction: the one, by removing its causes; the other, by controlling
its effects. There are again two methods of removing the causes of faction: the
one, by destroying the liberty which is essential to its existence; the other,
by giving to every citizen the same opinions, the same passions, and the same
interests. It could never be more truly said than of the first remedy, that it
was worse than the disease. Liberty is to faction what air is to fire, an
aliment without which it instantly expires. But it could not be less folly to
abolish liberty, which is essential to political life, because it nourishes
faction, than it would be to wish the annihilation of air, which is essential to
animal life, because it imparts to fire its destructive agency. The second
expedient is as impracticable as the first would be unwise. As long as the
reason of man continues fallible, and he is at liberty to exercise it, different
opinions will be formed. As long as the connection subsists between his reason
and his self-love, his opinions and his passions will have a reciprocal
influence on each other; and the former will be objects to which the latter will
attach themselves. The diversity in the faculties of men, from which the rights
of property originate, is not less an insuperable obstacle to a uniformity of
interests. The protection of these faculties is the first object of government.
From the protection of different and unequal faculties of acquiring property,
the possession of different degrees and kinds of property immediately results;
and from the influence of these on the sentiments and views of the respective
proprietors, ensues a division of the society into different interests and
parties. The latent causes of faction are thus sown in the nature of man; and we
see them everywhere brought into different degrees of activity, according to the
different circumstances of civil society. A zeal for different opinions
concerning religion, concerning government, and many other points, as well of
speculation as of practice; an attachment to different leaders ambitiously
contending for pre-eminence and power; or to persons of other descriptions whose
fortunes have been interesting to the human passions, have, in turn, divided
mankind into parties, inflamed them with mutual animosity, and rendered them
much more disposed to vex and oppress each other than to co-operate for their
common good. So strong is this propensity of mankind to fall into mutual
animosities, that where no substantial occasion presents itself, the most
frivolous and fanciful distinctions have been sufficient to kindle their
unfriendly passions and excite their most violent conflicts. But the most common
and durable source of factions has been the various and unequal distribution of
property. Those who hold and those who are without property have ever formed
distinct interests in society. Those who are creditors, and those who are
debtors, fall under a like discrimination. A landed interest, a manufacturing
interest, a mercantile interest, a moneyed interest, with many lesser interests,
grow up of necessity in civilized nations, and divide them into different
classes, actuated by different sentiments and views. The regulation of these
various and interfering interests forms the principal task of modern
legislation, and involves the spirit of party and faction in the necessary and
ordinary operations of the government. No man is allowed to be a judge in his
own cause, because his interest would certainly bias his judgment, and, not
improbably, corrupt his integrity. With equal, nay with greater reason, a body
of men are unfit to be both judges and parties at the same time; yet what are
many of the most important acts of legislation, but so many judicial
determinations, not indeed concerning the rights of single persons, but
concerning the rights of large bodies of citizens? And what are the different
classes of legislators but advocates and parties to the causes which they
determine? Is a law proposed concerning private debts? It is a question to which
the creditors are parties on one side and the debtors on the other. Justice
ought to hold the balance between them. Yet the parties are, and must be,
themselves the judges; and the most numerous party, or, in other words, the most
powerful faction must be expected to prevail. Shall domestic manufactures be
encouraged, and in what degree, by restrictions on foreign manufactures? are
questions which would be differently decided by the landed and the manufacturing
classes, and probably by neither with a sole regard to justice and the public
good. The apportionment of taxes on the various descriptions of property is an
act which seems to require the most exact impartiality; yet there is, perhaps,
no legislative act in which greater opportunity and temptation are given to a
predominant party to trample on the rules of justice. Every shilling with which
they overburden the inferior number, is a shilling saved to their own pockets.
It is in vain to say that enlightened statesmen will be able to adjust these
clashing interests, and render them all subservient to the public good.
Enlightened statesmen will not always be at the helm. Nor, in many cases, can
such an adjustment be made at all without taking into view indirect and remote
considerations, which will rarely prevail over the immediate interest which one
party may find in disregarding the rights of another or the good of the whole.
The inference to which we are brought is, that the CAUSES of faction cannot be
removed, and that relief is only to be sought in the means of controlling its
EFFECTS. If a faction consists of less than a majority, relief is supplied by
the republican principle, which enables the majority to defeat its sinister
views by regular vote. It may clog the administration, it may convulse the
society; but it will be unable to execute and mask its violence under the forms
of the Constitution. When a majority is included in a faction, the form of
popular government, on the other hand, enables it to sacrifice to its ruling
passion or interest both the public good and the rights of other citizens. To
secure the public good and private rights against the danger of such a faction,
and at the same time to preserve the spirit and the form of popular government,
is then the great object to which our inquiries are directed. Let me add that it
is the great desideratum by which this form of government can be rescued from
the opprobrium under which it has so long labored, and be recommended to the
esteem and adoption of mankind. By what means is this object attainable?
Evidently by one of two only. Either the existence of the same passion or
interest in a majority at the same time must be prevented, or the majority,
having such coexistent passion or interest, must be rendered, by their number
and local situation, unable to concert and carry into effect schemes of
oppression. If the impulse and the opportunity be suffered to coincide, we well
know that neither moral nor religious motives can be relied on as an adequate
control. They are not found to be such on the injustice and violence of
individuals, and lose their efficacy in proportion to the number combined
together, that is, in proportion as their efficacy becomes needful. From this
view of the subject it may be concluded that a pure democracy, by which I mean a
society consisting of a small number of citizens, who assemble and administer
the government in person, can admit of no cure for the mischiefs of faction. A
common passion or interest will, in almost every case, be felt by a majority of
the whole; a communication and concert result from the form of government
itself; and there is nothing to check the inducements to sacrifice the weaker
party or an obnoxious individual. Hence it is that such democracies have ever
been spectacles of turbulence and contention; have ever been found incompatible
with personal security or the rights of property; and have in general been as
short in their lives as they have been violent in their deaths. Theoretic
politicians, who have patronized this species of government, have erroneously
supposed that by reducing mankind to a perfect equality in their political
rights, they would, at the same time, be perfectly equalized and assimilated in
their possessions, their opinions, and their passions. A republic, by which I
mean a government in which the scheme of representation takes place, opens a
different prospect, and promises the cure for which we are seeking. Let us
examine the points in which it varies from pure democracy, and we shall
comprehend both the nature of the cure and the efficacy which it must derive
from the Union. The two great points of difference between a democracy and a
republic are: first, the delegation of the government, in the latter, to a small
number of citizens elected by the rest; secondly, the greater number of
citizens, and greater sphere of country, over which the latter may be extended.
The effect of the first difference is, on the one hand, to refine and enlarge
the public views, by passing them through the medium of a chosen body of
citizens, whose wisdom may best discern the true interest of their country, and
whose patriotism and love of justice will be least likely to sacrifice it to
temporary or partial considerations. Under such a regulation, it may well happen
that the public voice, pronounced by the representatives of the people, will be
more consonant to the public good than if pronounced by the people themselves,
convened for the purpose. On the other hand, the effect may be inverted. Men of
factious tempers, of local prejudices, or of sinister designs, may, by intrigue,
by corruption, or by other means, first obtain the suffrages, and then betray
the interests, of the people. The question resulting is, whether small or
extensive republics are more favorable to the election of proper guardians of
the public weal; and it is clearly decided in favor of the latter by two obvious
considerations: In the first place, it is to be remarked that, however small the
republic may be, the representatives must be raised to a certain number, in
order to guard against the cabals of a few; and that, however large it may be,
they must be limited to a certain number, in order to guard against the
confusion of a multitude. Hence, the number of representatives in the two cases
not being in proportion to that of the two constituents, and being
proportionally greater in the small republic, it follows that, if the proportion
of fit characters be not less in the large than in the small republic, the
former will present a greater option, and consequently a greater probability of
a fit choice. In the next place, as each representative will be chosen by a
greater number of citizens in the large than in the small republic, it will be
more difficult for unworthy candidates to practice with success the vicious arts
by which elections are too often carried; and the suffrages of the people being
more free, will be more likely to centre in men who possess the most attractive
merit and the most diffusive and established characters. It must be confessed
that in this, as in most other cases, there is a mean, on both sides of which
inconveniences will be found to lie. By enlarging too much the number of
electors, you render the representatives too little acquainted with all their
local circumstances and lesser interests; as by reducing it too much, you render
him unduly attached to these, and too little fit to comprehend and pursue great
and national objects. The federal Constitution forms a happy combination in this
respect; the great and aggregate interests being referred to the national, the
local and particular to the State legislatures. The other point of difference
is, the greater number of citizens and extent of territory which may be brought
within the compass of republican than of democratic government; and it is this
circumstance principally which renders factious combinations less to be dreaded
in the former than in the latter. The smaller the society, the fewer probably
will be the distinct parties and interests composing it; the fewer the distinct
parties and interests, the more frequently will a majority be found of the same
party; and the smaller the number of individuals composing a majority, and the
smaller the compass within which they are placed, the more easily will they
concert and execute their plans of oppression. Extend the sphere, and you take
in a greater variety of parties and interests; you make it less probable that a
majority of the whole will have a common motive to invade the rights of other
citizens; or if such a common motive exists, it will be more difficult for all
who feel it to discover their own strength, and to act in unison with each
other. Besides other impediments, it may be remarked that, where there is a
consciousness of unjust or dishonorable purposes, communication is always
checked by distrust in proportion to the number whose concurrence is necessary.
Hence, it clearly appears, that the same advantage which a republic has over a
democracy, in controlling the effects of faction, is enjoyed by a large over a
small republic,--is enjoyed by the Union over the States composing it. Does the
advantage consist in the substitution of representatives whose enlightened views
and virtuous sentiments render them superior to local prejudices and schemes of
injustice? It will not be denied that the representation of the Union will be
most likely to possess these requisite endowments. Does it consist in the
greater security afforded by a greater variety of parties, against the event of
any one party being able to outnumber and oppress the rest? In an equal degree
does the increased variety of parties comprised within the Union, increase this
security. Does it, in fine, consist in the greater obstacles opposed to the
concert and accomplishment of the secret wishes of an unjust and interested
majority? Here, again, the extent of the Union gives it the most palpable
advantage. The influence of factious leaders may kindle a flame within their
particular States, but will be unable to spread a general conflagration through
the other States. A religious sect may degenerate into a political faction in a
part of the Confederacy; but the variety of sects dispersed over the entire face
of it must secure the national councils against any danger from that source. A
rage for paper money, for an abolition of debts, for an equal division of
property, or for any other improper or wicked project, will be less apt to
pervade the whole body of the Union than a particular member of it; in the same
proportion as such a malady is more likely to taint a particular county or
district, than an entire State. In the extent and proper structure of the Union,
therefore, we behold a republican remedy for the diseases most incident to
republican government. And according to the degree of pleasure and pride we feel
in being republicans, ought to be our zeal in cherishing the spirit and
supporting the character of Federalists. PUBLIUS.
Papers: | 1-10 |